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Abstract
Our beliefs and opinions are shaped by others, making our social networks crucial in
determining what we believe to be true. Sometimes this is for the good because our
peers help us form a more accurate opinion. Sometimes it is for the worse because we
are led astray. In this context, we address via agent-based computer simulations the
extent to which patterns of connectivity within our social networks affect the likeli-
hood that initially undecided agents in a network converge on a true opinion following
group deliberation. The model incorporates a fine-grained and realistic representa-
tion of belief (opinion) and trust, and it allows agents to consult outside information
sources. We study a wide range of network structures and provide a detailed statisti-
cal analysis concerning the exact contribution of various network metrics to collective
competence. Our results highlight and explain the collective risks involved in an overly
networked or partitioned society. Specifically, we find that 96% of the variation in col-
lective competence across networks can be attributed to differences in amount of
connectivity (average degree) and clustering, which are negatively correlated with
collective competence. A study of bandwagon or “group think” effects indicates that
both connectivity and clustering increase the probability that the network, wholly or
partly, locks into a false opinion. Our work is interestingly related to Gerhard Schurz’s
work on meta-induction and can be seen as broadly addressing a practical limitation
of his approach.
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Does your social network influence what you believe to be true? Most probably, the
reader would answer this question in the affirmative. We may ask the further question:
does the structure of your social network, i.e. the pattern of communication, influence
what you believe to be true? This is perhaps less clear. The general question we address
in this paper is how, if at all, network topology affects the group’s ability to track truth.
There is an obvious commonsense or internet age answer to this question according
to which the more connected a community of agents is, the better it will be at tracking
truth. It would follow that the fully connected network, wherein everyone is connected
to everyone else, maximizes the truth tracking ability of the group. Despite its intuitive
appeal, the common sense answer has been undermined in a number of studies. This
goes for agent-based models (e.g. Bala and Goyal 1998; Zollman 2007; Lazer and
Freidman 2007) as well as for empirical studies (e.g. Mason et al. 2008; Jönsson et al.
2015). The bottom line is that having more connections in a group can be bad from
a truth-tracking perspective, although several studies have found that it often speeds
up a group’s ability to converge on an opinion, be it true or false (e.g. Zollman 2007;
Mason et al. 2008), and that the “less is more” effect depends on context (Frey and
Šešelja 2018). What this suggests is that there are few simple truths in this area of
research.
However, studies in the literature typically focus on only a few network topologies.
For example, Mason et al. (2008) confine their attention to four network types. It
would be desirable to look at a richer set of networks. Also, in terms of explaining the
performance of various network structures, there is an emphasis on network density
(the number of actual connections divided by the number of possible ones) at the
expense of other network metrics (e.g. Zollman 2007), though as our study will show,
density turns out to be a key factor.
Unfortunately, the by far most influential agent-based model for studying collective
competence, introduced in Hegselmann and Krause (2002, 2006), lacks the flexibility
necessary for studying the general effects of network structure. As Hegselmann has
pointed out to us (personal communication), there are two ways to think about the
H–K model in terms of network structure: (a) There is an underlying fully connected
network, but only the links to agents whose opinions are sufficiently similar count for
the updating procedure. (b) There is a fixed number of agents. Between these agents
a process of dynamical networking is going on. In each period the actual network is
given by linking all agents with opinions that are sufficiently similar, and updating is
averaging over all linked opinions. Either way, it is not possible to study the effect
of network structure independently of similarity of opinion. The H–K model, further,
shares a limitation of the earlier DeGroot model in being “rigid in that agents do not
adjust the weights they place on others’ opinions over time” (Golub and Jackson 2010,
p. 113).
Instead, we will use a Bayesian agent-based model called Laputa (e.g. Masterton
and Olsson 2014; Olsson 2011; Olsson and Vallinder 2013; Vallinder and Olsson
2014). The rich and flexible Laputa framework (Douven and Kelp 2011) allows one
to model agents that match the challenge of real-world information acquisition in
two fundamental ways: (1) we receive evidence both from our own observation or
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interaction with the world and through the testimony of others and (2) we do not
come to either of these sources knowing accurately their reliability. Hence Laputa
incorporates a mechanism for representing and updating both trust among agents in
the network, in the sense of “perceived reliability”, i.e. the weights they place on
others’ opinions over time, and for estimating the reliability of agent’s own inquiry.
While one would expect the topology of the social network constituted via the
Laputa agents’ communication to affect their accuracy, it seems difficult to predict the
exact impact given the potentially complex interactions between perceived reliability,
communication, and evidence from the world. Actual simulations are thus required.
Our study will focus on a comparatively large selection of networks and a number
of well-known network metrics. Using regression analysis we identify the network
characteristics that make unique contributions to collective competence (in Goldman’s
1999 sense), focusing on a scenario in which the agents are initially more or less
undecided on the issue at hand.
Our work is interestingly related to Schurz’s seminal work on “meta-induction”—in
the simplest case copying the method of the most successful network peer—and can be
seen as broadly addressing a practical limitation of his approach. As Schurz points out,
in a society characterized by division of cognitive labor indicators of trustworthiness of
purported informants is of the utmost importance (Schurz, 2009, p. 201; see also Thorn
and Schurz 2012). Schutz distinguishes between two sources of trustworthiness. One
possibility is to understand trustworthiness as something entirely internal to society.
Schurz calls this position “goal-internalism”. The other possibility is to conceive it,
following Goldman (1999), as deriving from something external, namely objective
reliability. This is the “goal-externalist” position recommended by Schurz. Now, as
Schurz’s notes, meta-induction presupposes “an objective and consensual criterion
of past successes in predictions (or actions based on predictions)” (ibid, p. 2018). In
other words, the meta-inductive agent must know the track-records of the other agents.
The problem is that this condition is arguably rarely satisfied in practice. What to do
when it is not? This is where our study becomes relevant. As indicated in Collins et al.
(2018), when a track-record is missing, people are happy to update their trust in a
given source on the basis of message content. If the source says something expected,
this tells in favor of the source’s reliability. If, by contrast, the source says something
unexpected, it tells against the source’s reliability. While being firmly goal-externalist
in the sense that outside sources are assumed to have an objective reliability, our model
assumes that the network agents have access to this reliability only indirectly through
the messages produced by the sources. Agents are thus forced to infer trustworthiness
based on message content in the way described. Our model incorporated this idea in a
full-fledged Bayesian framework. As we will see, the flip side of the coin is that group
performance becomes negatively affected by connectivity and clustering to the extent





To appreciate the results reported here, it is necessary only that the reader grasp the
broad features of the Laputa model. Consequently, this section conveys only the basic
ideas behind the framework. More detailed expositions can be found in Olsson (2013)
and Vallinder and Olsson (2014). Agents in the network are assumed to be concerned
with answering the question whether p, where p is a proposition which can be true
or false. Agents in the network start out with a certain degree of belief (credence)
in p. What happens then is that the agents engage in inquiry and deliberation in the
sense that they can receive information from an outside source or from network peers.
This takes place in a number of rounds or steps representing an opportunity to receive
information from inquiry or other agents, or transmit information to other agents.
The credence assigned to a proposition p by an agent α after inquiry and deliberation
in a social network depends (among other things) on:
– reports from α’s outside source
– how many of α’s peers claim that p or not-p
– how often they do it
– α’s trust in (perceived reliability of) her peers
Thus an agent will be impressed by repeated information coming from many different
sources, especially highly trusted ones.
Every model of a complex part of reality needs to be simplified and streamlined to
be at all workable. Models of social network communication are no exceptions. As
for Laputa, the following are assumed:
– At every round in deliberation, inquirers (outside sources) can communicate p, not-p
or be silent
– Trust is modelled as a second order probability, i.e. as a credence in the reliability
of the source
– Reports coming from different sources at the same time are viewed by receiving
inquirers as independent
– Reports from outside sources are treated as independent
Olsson (2013) argues that the assumptions are justifiable from a dual process per-
spective. Thus, the constraint that agents in the model view each other as independent
information sources can be viewed as a plausible default strategy attributed to system
(process) 1 employed in the absence of concrete signs of trouble. The independence
of outside sources is compatible with many plausible scenarios, such as the incoming
information deriving from disjoint personal networks of the agents (Fig. 1).
Olsson (2013) also gives reason to think that the broad features of the model are in
line with the influential Persuasive Argument Theory tradition in social psychology
(for an overview, see Isenberg 1986). For instance, agents in Laputa polarize in the
sense of Sunstein (2002).
As noted above, a feature of the Laputa model is that both degrees of belief
(credences) and trust values are updated dynamically in the process of inquiry and
deliberation. In both cases, updating takes place in adherence to the Bayesian princi-
ple of conditionalization on the new evidence. To illustrate, agent α’s new credence in
p after hearing that p (or its negation, ¬p) from source σ is given by:
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value of the trust function assigned to source σ by agent α. As for the top equation, the
new credence in p for agent α after receiving the information p from network peer σ is
the old credence of p conditional on the fact that σ reported that p. This in turn can be
reduced to the expression on the right-hand side which depends on the old credence
for p (¬p) as well as the (expected value) of the trust function which α associates
with σ. A report that not-p (¬p) is handled analogously (see bottom equation). For the
function for updating trust and its derivation, see “Appendix C”.
The underlying Bayesian machinery gives rise to some suggestive qualitative updat-
ing rules for credences and trust values (Table 1). A +-sign means stronger credence
(in the current direction), an up-arrow more trust, and so on. For example, a trusted
source reporting an expected message leads to the receiver strengthening her current
credence in the message as well as her trust in the source (upper left-most box). To
take another example, a distrusted source delivering an unexpected message leads to
the receiver strengthening her current credence but lowering her trust (lower right-
most box), revealing that being distrusted in Laputa amounts to being viewed as a
falsity-teller.
A network structure or topology is a particular kind of social arrangement. Our
interest in this paper is in the truth-tracking properties of social arrangements as
studied within social epistemology. In measuring the truth-tracking performance of
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Table 1 Qualitative rules for updating credences and trust in Laputa
Message expected Neither nor Message unexpected
Source trusted + (↑) ↑ ( ) − (↓)
Neither nor 0 (↑) 0 ( ) 0 (↓)
Source distrusted − (↑) ↓ ( ) + (↓)
a topology we follow Goldman (1999), specifically his theory of veritistic value (V-
value, for short), in assuming that, ideally, an agent should have full belief in the truth.
If it is true that it will rain, then an agent should fully believe that it will, i.e. assign
credence 1 to that fact. If it is true that the Eurozone will collapse, then an agent should
believe fully that it will, and so on (assuming, of course, that the agent cares about
these propositions in the first place). More generally, inquirers are better off the closer
they are to fulfilling this ideal, i.e. the closer their degree of belief in the truth is to full
belief in the truth. So if it is true that it will rain, then an agent assigning credence 0.7
to that proposition is better off than an agent assigning only credence 0.6.
From this perspective, a network topology is epistemically advantageous to the
extent that agents engaging in group deliberation constrained by that topology move
closer to the truth on average. Thus, a network structure which is such that when
agents allows it to govern their communication makes the agents more inclined to
assign high credence to the truth is better than a network structure which does not
have this property, or has it but to a lesser degree. In our simulations, we assume, by
convention, that the proposition p is true and hence that its negation, not-p, is false.
This also means that the collective accuracy of the agents in the simulation can be
represented simply by the average degree of belief. There is a sizeable literature on
how best to measure accuracy (Maher 1993; Joyce 1998; Fallis 2007; Kopec 2012),
and, in particular, whether it requires the use of a so-called proper scoring rule, such
as the squared error or “Brier score” (Brier 1950). This question can be set aside,
because reporting the average degree of belief, and the increase of the average degree
of belief, given the convention that the true value is always 1, will lead to the same
answers vis-à-vis our central question as a monotonic transformation such as squaring
the deviation of that mean to probability 1. Our interest lies with the effects of topology
on collective competence and the network properties that mediate it. The presence or
absence of such effects is unaffected by such transformations, and the regressions we
conduct identify the same moderators using the absolute deviation and the squared
error, varying only slightly in the absolute goodness-of-fit obtained. Consequently, we
report absolute deviations between the average degree of belief in the network and the
true value, or what has been referred to as veritistic value (Goldman 1999).1
The Laputa model has been implemented in a computer program bearing the same
name. Once a given network has been implemented, the Laputa program can run tens
1 Differences between absolute and squared error only emerge when one considers not measures of col-
lective accuracy, but individual accuracy, such as the mean individual error (see also Jönsson et al. 2015).
This may affect the rank order of the topologies with respect to accuracy, but, once again, it does not affect
the fact that topology influences accuracy. We pursue the differences between individual and collective
competence in more detail elsewhere (Hahn et al. in preparation).
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of thousands of simulations (group deliberations) using the same network structure.
The program then outputs the average V-value and other useful statistical information.
Laputa is flexible in the sense that it allows for a number of parameters to be
determined before running a simulation. In this study, we focus on a scenario in which
all agents are initially more or less unsure about the truth of the proposition p. This
is captured by having agents’ initial credence in p selected from a normal distribution
with expected value 0.5 and standard deviation 0.1. This means that when the Laputa
simulator creates the initial state of a network, it picks the initial credences for the
agents in the network from such a distribution. In other words, agents will, on average,
start out with a credence of 0.5 in p, although some start out slightly lower and others
slightly higher. This kind of scenario would be realistic for instance if the agents are
deliberating on a new issue regarding which they have not yet reached a firm opinion.
Note that there is no particular relationship between an agent’s initial credence in p
and the reliability of his or her outside source. The parameter values for the latter are
described below.
As for the other parameters, we were careful to select distributions that can plausibly
be said to capture a normal situation:
(a) Agents engage in communication for some time but not indefinitely. Our sim-
ulations cover both medium and longer communicational activity (15 vs. 30
simulation rounds).
(b) Agents rely on outside sources that are at least somewhat reliable, and they ini-
tially trust, to some extent, their sources and each other. Also, they don’t have to
be absolutely sure that they are right in order to communicate with their peers; it is
sufficient that the credence is above a given threshold, called the communication
threshold. In the simulations, parameter values for reliability of inquiry (= outside
source), initial inquiry trust, initial peer trust and communication threshold were
selected from a normal distribution with expected value 0.748 and standard devi-
ation 0.098.
(c) Finally, we assumed that agents reasonably often ask their outside sources and
communicate their view given that their credence meets the requirement set by
the communication threshold. Accordingly, the parameters inquiry chance and
communication chance were selected from an interval distribution with expected
value 0.5 and standard deviation 0.0289.
For example, the assumptions we have made would be reasonable in a case of jury
deliberation in which the jurors, who do not know each other, are initially ignorant
regarding the guilt of the defendant, assuming that the jurors are normal in terms of
having a somewhat trusting, outspoken and reliable nature but varying in their level of
activity regarding inquiry (which in this case can be viewed as involving consultation
of their memory of the trial) as well as communication with other jurors. Since in a
normal jury every juror can communicate with any other, this example would involve a
fully connected network (see Fig. 2). The assumptions are also plausible for capturing
online communication in an anonymous setting in which, as in the juror case, people do
not know each other’s true reliability, and in which participants are initially ignorant
regarding the true answer to the underlying question. In this case, many network
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Fig. 2 Networks studied of size 10
structures could be relevant, such as the small world network in which strangers are
being linked by a short chain of acquaintances (see Fig. 2).
The fact that parameter values for reliability of inquiry and initial inquiry trust are
selected (independently) from the same distribution implies that agents are initially
reasonably well calibrated regarding their trust in their respective outside source. Since
trust is dynamically updated in the model while the reliability of the outside source
remains fixed, the degree of calibration may, and typically does, change in the course
of inquiry and deliberation.
Networks were selected for inclusion in the study on the basis of prominence in the
literature. Thus, we included all networks in the aforementioned studies by Zollman
(2007) and Mason et al. (2007). All in all, 36 networks of size 10, 15 and 18 were
included. The networks of size 10 are listed in Fig. 2.
In each case, 10,000 variations of the background parameters (trust, reliability etc.)














Batch 15            Avg. V-Value Δ          10 000 trials
Fig. 3 Increase in V-value as a function of network structure for networks of size 10
deliberation ran for 15 or 30 steps during which inquirers could inquire or commu-
nicate. The results to be presented are the average results over these 10,000 runs of
the same network structure. The confidence level was 95%, with possible error in the
third decimal meaning that visible differences are statistically significant in the figures
below.
We have collected further details and background information in several appendices.
“Appendix A” contains pictures of all networks included in our study. “Appendix B”
contains sample Laputa output in single network mode, and “Appendix C” sketches
the derivations of the Laputa updating rules for credence and trust. Finally, “Appendix
D” defines and explains the network metrics used.
3 Results
We computed the V-value associated with each network structure against the backdrop
of our normality assumptions. The results in terms of increase in V-value for networks
of size 10 are displayed in Fig. 3. Blue bars signify results for 15 step simulations and
red bars the corresponding results for 30 step simulations.
Combining Figs. 2 and 3, we may conclude that greater connectivity means less
V-value. Thus, the fully connected network gives rise to less increase in V-value than,
say, the scale free network. On the other hand, more connected networks converge
more quickly on a stable state as can be visually confirmed from Fig. 3 by comparing
the difference between the blue and corresponding red bar. The smaller the difference
is, the quicker the network reaches a stable state. For instance, the regular4distant
network converges rapidly whereas the no-connections network continues to improve
significantly after 15 steps. Since speed of convergence was not the focus of our study
we did not study it systematically. As we mentioned in the introduction, these results
are in line with conclusions reached in Zollman (2007) and Mason et al. (2008).
A further observation is that several networks have the same degree of connectivity
and yet they differ regarding V-value. This holds for the small world network which is
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Fig. 4 Correlations between networks metrics and V-values
V-better than the regular network which in turn is V-better than the regular2 network.
Similarly, regular4distant performs better regarding V-value than regular4. We may
conclude that something other than connectivity is playing a role in determining the
V-value of a given network. To find out what is driving these results we studied the
correlations between V-value and a collection of prominent network metrics across all
36 networks, drawing on influential work in network analysis (Borgatti 2005; Easley
and Kleinberg 2010; Freeman 1977, 1979; Jackson 2010; Milgram 1967; Newman
2010; De Nooy et al. 2011; Watts 1999; Watts and Strogatz 1998). See “Appendix D”
for details about these metrics and what they mean. The results are shown in Fig. 4.
As before blue bars are results from 15 simulations steps, and red bars are results from
30 simulation steps.
As shown in Fig. 4, we observed positive correlations between V-value and all
degree centralization, all closeness centralization, betweenness centralization, aver-
age distance and diameter. We registered negative correlations between V-value and
number of edges, average degree, density, Watts-Strogatz clustering coefficient and
clustering coefficient (transitivity).
Many of the metrics are highly correlated. We thus conducted hierarchical, step-
wise regressions in order to identify those metrics that explained unique proportions
of the variance in collective competence. On this analysis, only average degree and
the clustering coefficient make unique contributions in accounting for differences in
veritistic value across all networks studied. More precisely, the following conclusions
could be established:
1. Average degree explains 90% of the variation in V-value.
2. A combined model of average degree and clustering coefficient is the best model
accounting for 96% of the variation in V-value.
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Average degree is the average number of nodes a given node is connected to. This is a
measure of connectivity similar to density. The clustering coefficient can be grasped by
noting that for a given node we can ask how many of its neighbors are connected them-
selves. The coefficient now measures the actual number of such “triangles” relative to
all possible ones. See “Appendix D” for a definition.
We may conclude that the difference in V-value between networks of the same con-
nectivity (average degree) comes mainly from clustering. The conclusion can quickly
be checked by observing that the networks of the same connectivity that we found
to be V-better are also less clustered. For example, the small world network is less
clustered than the regular network which in turn is less clustered than the regular2
network, and so on. That connectivity and clustering are the driving forces behind our
results were confirmed in a further study of larger networks involving seven networks
of size 100 and seven networks of size 150 similar to some of the networks included in
our main study. Again, we found that networks with a higher average degree promote
V-value to a lesser degree and that among networks having the same average degree
those that are more clustered perform worse.
4 Discussion
The question remains why we get the results that we get. Why are connectivity and
clustering detrimental to collective competence in our study? Note that in our model,
agents are assumed to be initially more or less undecided: the initial credence in p
was determined by a normal distribution with expected value 0.5 and standard devi-
ation 0.1. Hence there is a fair chance that a majority of inquirers in the network
initially tend to believe, falsely, that not-p is the case. The higher the connectivity in
the network, the more the misled majority can drag down the whole, or parts of, the net-
work. By Table 1, mechanisms of trust consolidate this phenomenon by strengthening
trust within groups of like-minded, and lowering trust in agents delivering belief-
contravening (unexpected) information—whether it comes from within or outside the
network. A less connected network, by contrast, is better equipped to recover from an
unfortunate selection of initial degrees of belief due to the assumed independence and
relative reliability of the outside sources.
Bala and Goyal (1998), using a different Bayesian model, observed that more
connectivity may have detrimental effects on group competences due to the fact that
“more informational links can increase the chances of a society getting locked into a
sub-optimal action” (609). Thus, there is reason to think that our proposed explanation
may capture a general connectivity effect which is not an artifact of our particular
model.
We hypothesize that clustering can be harmful for similar reasons. A cluster which
is initially on the wrong track can reinforce itself through internal communication,
locking into a false belief. Internal trust turns the cluster into a group of “conspiracy
theorists”. This is presumably why the mere rewiring of one of the links in a cluster
(as in transition from regular4 to regular4 distant) can have a beneficial effect even
though connectivity stays the same.
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Fig. 5 Amount of good bandwagoning (towards the truth) for different networks
To test these hypotheses we studied the bandwagon effect for various network types,
by which we mean the percent of all updates where, as a result of communication
from others, an agent’s degree of belief has been changed in the opposite direction
from her own opinion or information from her outside source. Bandwagoning thus
means that you are led to believe something due to social influence that runs counter
to your personal information or opinion. As such it is a neutral phenomenon from
an epistemological perspective. What matters is whether your peers take you in the
right direction. Hence, bandwagoning toward p (true) is good, whereas bandwagoning
toward not-p (false) is bad.
Now if our hypotheses are true, then (i) highly connected networks should have
some more good, and a lot more bad, bandwagoning, and (ii) more clustered networks
should have more bad bandwagoning given same connectivity. Both these predictions
turn out to hold in our study, as shown in Figs. 5 and 6.
Thus, a highly connected network like the fully connected network has some more
good bandwagoning but a lot more bad bandwagoning than a less connected network
such as the circle. Moreover, among networks of the same connectivity, the more clus-
tered ones have more bad bandwagoning. For instance, the regular2 network has more
bad bandwagoning than the small world network. In fact, the regular2 network has less
good bandwagoning than the small world network as well. At any rate, differences in
bad bandwagoning are more pronounced than difference in good bandwagoning for
networks of the same connectivity.
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Fig. 6 Amount of bad bandwagoning (towards error) for different networks
Fig. 7 Final credence in the truth for small world network (left) and regular2 network (right)
Our study of bandwagoning effects in networks supports the truth of our hypotheses,
albeit in an indirect, global way. To get a more direct or local sense of what is going on,
we zoomed in on the individual nodes in a network to see how clustering affects the
agents that occupy the corresponding network positions. We compared two networks
from this perspective: small world and regular2. Figure 7 shows the final credences in p
for the various network positions. The credences are averages over 10,000 simulations,
each simulation running for 15 rounds using the same parameter distributions as before.
A fuller color means higher final credence in the true proposition p.
As shown in Fig. 7, agents occupying positions in the clusters in the regular2 net-
work end up with a relatively low credence in the truth, which supports our hypothesis
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that clusters have a tendency to reinforce and consolidate false belief. Agents not
occupying cluster positions do significantly better. In the less-clustered small world
network, differences in outcome between network positions are less salient, although
more connected positions are slightly less advantageous than less connected ones. A
more detailed study of the effects of network structure on agents occupying individual
network position is planned for a future article.
Finally, the fact that the best network is in a sense the “empty” network admittedly
renders the rest of our analysis somewhat hollow. Why bother figuring out which
among many different networks is better or worse, when keeping people isolated is
best? Our first reply is there are many different reasons why people hook up in net-
works. Improving one’s own epistemic position is surely one of them, but hardly the
only one, as the activity on any online social network amply illustrates. Hence, we
would expect a network structure in many cases to be given partly by non-epistemic
factors, such as a social impulse to communicate. Our model contributes to the tool
box that can be used to evaluate an existing network and its variations from a purely
epistemic standpoint. Second, the time perspective used in the present study was
that of medium to longer term (15 and 30 step simulations, respectively). Prelimi-
nary simulations show that connectivity is more attractive and can in fact improve
V-performance in shorter simulations. A more extensive investigation into this phe-
nomenon and its causes would require another article. Finally, as confirmed in Angere
and Olsson (2017), density becomes V-attractive in Laputa if constraints are introduced
that preclude agents from repeating information in the absence of new information
from the outside source or other agents. Hence, the simple model used in the present
paper corresponds to the case in which agents are free to “spam” the network with
repeated messages without having received new evidence in-between—a situation not
too unlike that holding in online social networks. A further interesting question, also
left for future investigation, is what the correlation between various network metrics,
on the one hand, and V-value, on the other, looks like once these “quality contraints”
are imposed on communication.
5 Conclusions
We addressed via agent-based computer simulations the extent to which the patterns
of connectivity within our social networks affect the likelihood that network peers
converge on a true opinion on an issue regarding which they are initially more or less
undecided. We explored a wide range of network structures and provided a detailed
statistical analysis into the exact contribution of various network metrics to collective
competence. Moreover, unlike other similar agent-based models the framework used in
this article incorporates a more fine-grained and, we believe, realistic representation
of belief and, in particular, trust, where the latter is dynamically updated as agents
continuously receive information from their network peers, and the framework also
allows for agents to receive information continuously from outside the network.
We found that 96% of the variation in collective competence across different net-
works can be attributed to differences in amount of connectivity (average degree) and
clustering. Both these factors are in our model negatively correlated with collective
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competence. We explained these facts by reference to the increased risk of the group
wholly or partly locking into a false belief in a highly connected or clustered network.
Our hypotheses were corroborated by observing that connectivity and clustering co-
vary with what we called bad bandwagoning. In other words, initially undecided agents
in a tightly connected or clustered network are more likely eventually to have their
true personal information or opinion overridden by false group opinion. To be sure,
they are more likely to have their false personal information or opinion overridden
by true group opinion as well, but this positive effect is less pronounced and also not
without exceptions.
By zooming in on individual network positions in two of the studied networks we
were able to observe how agents occupying network positions in a cluster ended up
with a relatively low average credence in the truth following inquiry and deliberation.
Agents not occupying cluster positions did significantly better. In a less clustered net-
work differences in final degrees of belief between network positions are less salient,
although our study indicated that more connected network positions are slightly less
advantageous than less connected ones. In highlighting and explaining the collective
risks which are involved in connectivity and clustering our study suggests that popular
belief in the virtues of the network society should give way for a more nuanced picture
which takes into account negative effects on the truth tracking properties of networks.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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Appendix B: Sample Laputa output
We give sample output from Laputa for the “Sherlock Holms network” depicted below
running Laputa in the single network mode. Each time step represents a round in the
simulation. What happens during a round is determined by the updating rules in Laputa
and the value of the parameters, e.g. inquiry chance and initial degree of belief.
Time: 1
Inquirer Mycroft Holmes heard that p from inquirer Sherlock Holmes, lowering
his/her expected trust in the source from 0.513 to 0.513.
This raised his/her degree of belief in p from 0.50000 to 0.51299.
Time: 2
(* Nothing happened *)
Time: 3
Inquirer Mrs Hudson received the result that not-p from inquiry, raising his/her
expected trust in it from 0.642 to 0.672.
This lowered his/her degree of belief in p from 0.27923 to 0.17761
Time: 4
Inquirer Sherlock Holmes received the result that p from inquiry, raising his/her
expected trust in it from 0.371 to 0.452.
Inquirer Sherlock Holmes heard that not-p from inquirer Prof Moriarty, lowering
his/her expected trust in the source from 0.656 to 0.573.
This lowered his/her degree of belief in p from 0.91000 to 0.75815
Time: 5
Inquirer Sherlock Holmes received the result that not-p from inquiry, lowering
his/her expected trust in it from 0.452 to 0.414.




Inquirer Sherlock Holmes heard that not-p from inquirer Prof Moriarty, lowering
his/her expected trust in the source from 0.573 to 0.525.
This lowered his/her degree of belief in p from 0.79160 to 0.73859
Inquirer Dr Watson heard that not-p from inquirer Mrs Hudson, lowering his/her
expected trust in the source from 0.581 to 0.576.
This lowered his/her degree of belief in p from 0.53000 to 0.44843
…
Appendix C: Themathematics behind Laputa
In this appendix we sketch the derivations of the credence and trust update function
in Laputa. These derivations make use of a number of idealizations and technical
assumptions. The reader may want to consult Olsson (2013) or Vallinder and Olsson
(2014) for more details on the intuitive meaning and justification of these assumptions.




















) × Ctα(p) × Ctα(a < rσα < b)
Ctα
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where rσα is the reliability of the source σ vis-à-vis agent α, 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1, Ctα(p)
the credence that agent α assigns to p at time t, Stσα(p) the proposition that source σ
communicates p to agent α at time t, mtσα is the content of the source σ ’s message,
and Σ tα is the set of sources that give information to α at t.
Since the trust function, which plays a crucial part in the model, is continuous,
the derivation will sometimes need to take a detour through conditional probability
densities rather than the conditional probabilities themselves. We will briefly sketch
how this can be done here.
123
Synthese
We have so far not been specific about theσ–algebra Z that Ctα is defined on. Assume
that it is product of several such algebras, the first of which is discrete and generated
by atomic events such as p, ¬p, Sβα(p) etc., and the others, which are continuous, are
generated by events of the form a ≤ rσα ≤ b. Call the first algebra X and the others
Yσ0 , . . . , Yσn . It is clear that, as long as time and the number of inquirers are both finite,
X will have only finitely many elements. On the other hand, Yσ0 , . . . , Yσn are certainly
infinite. As mentioned, we assume that Z  X ×Yσ0 ×· · ·×Yσn . Given any source σ k
and time t, we can therefore interpret the part of Ctα defined on the subalgebra X ×Yσk
of Z as arising from a joint density function κτσα(ϕ; x) defined through the equation




Since we have used the comma to represent conjunction earlier in the paper we
use a semicolon here to separate the two variables: the first propositional, and the
second real-valued. Like τ , this distribution’s existence and essential uniqueness are
guaranteed by the Radon-Nikodym theorem, and in fact τ tσα is the marginal distribution
of κ tσα with respect to the reliability variable rσα in question. Since the conditional
distribution of a random variable is the joint distribution divided by the marginal




which is what will be used to make sense of what it means to conditionalize on rσα
having a certain value rather than merely being inside an interval. Setting rσα  x, a 
x − 	 and b  x + 	 in PP and CI and letting 	 → 0, we get the versions
Principal Principle0(P Plim) : κ tσα
(
Stσα(p)|Stσα, p; x

















) × Ctα(¬p) × τ tσα(x)
We can now proceed with the actual derivation. By conditionalization, we must









. Applying Bayes’ theorem and













































































. Our next task is thus to derive these expressions. Since Stσα(p)










Applying first the definition of conditional probability and then the continuous law of
total probability, the definition of conditional probability again, and finally CI lim, we


















) × τ tσα(r)dx
But PPlim ensures that κ tσα
(
Stσα(p)|Stσα, p; x









x × τ tσα(x)dx  Ctα
(
Stσα
) × E[τ tσα
]











Now let Σ tα(p) ⊆ Σ tα be the set of sources that give α the message p at t, and let
Σ tα(¬p)  Σ tα\Σ tα(p). Plugging the above expressions into our earlier result gives






































































) × E[τ tσα
])
For the derivation of the trust update expression we assume PP and CI , but not SI .
The function we wish to derive is






for a source σ of α, and a message mtσα from that source. Assume that mtσα ≡ p (the
case mtσα ≡ ¬p is completely symmetrical). Applying the definition of conditional
probability, the equivalence Stσα ∧ Stσα(p) ≡ Stσα(p), and the (discrete) law of total
probability, we get






















































Now apply PPlim and CI lim to the factors in both terms of the numerator, and then
again the equivalence Stσα ∧ Stσα(p) ≡ Stσα(p):
κ tσα(x |Stσα(p))  τ tσα(x) × Ctα
(
Stσα
) × x × C
t
α(p) + x¯ × Ctα(¬p)
Ctα(Stσα(p))
 τ tσα(x) ×
x × Ctα(p) + x¯ × Ctα(¬p)
Ctα(Stσα(p)|Stσα)
We can calculate the denominator in this expression by using the definition of
conditional probability and expanding twice using the law of total probability (once




















































Let us refer to the last expression as ψ . Applying CI lim, then cancelling, and apply-
ing PPlim, we get

















x × τ tσα(x)dx + Ctα(¬p) ×
1∫
0
x¯ × τ tσα(x)dx








Putting it all together, we finally arrive at the updating rule for trust:
τ t+1σα (x)  τ tσα(x) ×









Appendix D: Networkmetrics used
In this appendix we will properly define the network measures we have calculated
for the various networks in our study. These measures are all common measures from
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the network literature [see Easley and Kleinberg (2010), Jackson (2010) or Newman
(2010)]. The terminology used in this section will mostly be borrowed from Jackson
(2010), but as the measures for the particular networks where calculated using the
program Pajek (De Nooy et al. 2011), we will deviate from Jackson (2010) whenever
the measures are calculated in a different way in Pajek.
By a network we will understand an undirected graph (N, g), where N {1, 2, …,
n} is the set of nodes also referred to as vertices, individuals, or inquirers. g is a set of
pairs (i, j) specifying which links between nodes are present in the network. We will
also write ij for (i, j) and if ij ∈ g then we will say that there is a link/edge/tie between
i and j. As networks are undirected graphs we will not distinguish between ij and ji
(i.e. ij ∈ g will be equivalent to ji ∈ g). In the following (N, g) will refer to a given
arbitrary network with N {1, 2, …, n}. The neighborhood Ni(g) of a node i is the set
of nodes that i is linked to, that is Ni (g)  { j |i j ∈ g}. The degree of a node i, denoted
by di(g), is the total number of nodes i is linked, in other words, di (g)  #Ni (g),
where #A denotes the cardinality of the set A.
Our first measure is the average degree, which says something about how connected
each inquirer is on average, and is defined by:





A related measure is the density of a network. The density of a network is the
fraction of links actually present in the network relative to the number of possible
links. For a network with n notes, the number of all possible links is n(n − 1)/2 (as
the network is undirected). Thus the density is given by2:
den(g)  #g




n − 1 ,
and thus, average degree and density are highly correlated—even perfectly correlated
if the size of the networks is kept fixed. As exhaustively discussed in the introduction,
the significance of a network’s density on its potential as an information passing
structure, has been widely discussed in the literature.
While average degree and density say something about how connected a network
is, there are much more to a network’s structure than captured by these measures.
Another structural property one could consider is the distances between nodes (-how
many links one has to pass through to reach one node from another), which may say
something about how fast things such as diseases or information can spread through
a network. It turns out that the distances between nodes are surprisingly small in real
networks, which is known as the “Small-world phenomenon” (or the “six degrees of
2 Here we only count eitherij ∈ g or ji ∈ g, but not both!
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separation” or the “Kevin Bacon effect” (Watts 1999)) and goes back to a famous
experiments by Milgram (1967). Let us turn to the formal definitions.
A path from a node i to another node j is a sequence of distinct nodes i1, i2, …, im
such that i1  i, im  j, and ikik+1 ∈ g for all k ∈ {1, 2, …, m −1}. In other words,
there is a path from i to j if one can reach j from i by following a sequence of distinct
links in the network. The length of such a path is the number of links in it (i.e. m −
1). A shortest path from i to j is a path from i to j such that there are no other path
from i to j with a shorter length. The distance between two nodes i and j is the length
of a shortest path between them (if there is any path between i and j at all) and will
be denoted by dist(i, j). We say that two nodes are connected if there is a path (and
thereby necessarily a shortest path) between then. A network is connected if every
pair of distinct nodes i and j are connected. Traditionally, the average distance of a






However, since there might not always be a path between two nodes i and j (if the
network is not connected), the average distance is calculated a little bit different in
Pajek. Let,
A := {(i, j)|i, j ∈ N , i  j, and dist(i, j) is defined}.
Then, the average distance, distAvg(g), is calculated in Pajek in the following way:





The diameter of a network is the length of the longest shortest part in it:
diameter(g)  maxi, j∈N dist(i, j).
If the network is not connected, Pajek calculates the above formula as if dist(i j) is 0
for notes i and j that are not connected. Thereby, the diameter is always the maximum
of all shortest paths.3 Note that the diameter of a network puts an upper bound on
the average distance of the network, but the diameter can sometimes be significantly
larger than the average distance.
A node’s particular position in a network can be important and centralization mea-
sures are all trying to measure this effect. We will consider three different measures if
centrality that are widely used in social network analysis. As such these measures are
local to nodes of a network, but Pajek also provides global “summations” of the local
3 Jackson (2010) defines dist(i, j) to be infinite if i and j are not connected. Thus, disconnected networks
have infinite diameters according to Jackson (2010). Alternatively, one could report as the diameter of a
disconnected network, the diameter of the largest connected component of it (i.e. the largest subset of notes
that forms a connected network).
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measures that we will use. The first simple measure is degree centralization, which
measures the degree of a node relative to the size of the network, i.e. for a node i the
degree centrality of i is defined by:
CeDi (g) 
di (g)
n − 1 .
Pajek provides a measure for the overall degree centrality of a network (“All Degree





CeD∗ (g) − CeDi (g)
)
n − 2 ,
where CeD∗ (g) is the maximum of the individual degree centralities CeDi (g).
Degree centrality captures some form of importance of centrality of nodes, however,
it is often way to simple. For instance, a node with only two links might connect two
otherwise separated part of a network and thereby play a central role if information
(or other things) has to pass from the one part to the other. Betweenness centrality is
a measure, initially defined by Freeman (1977), which is an attempt to capture such
potential control over communication. Specifically, betweenness centrality measures
how many shortest paths (between other nodes) a given node lies on. Formally, for a
node i the betweenness centrality of i is defined by:
CeBi (g) 
∑
k, j∈N ,k  j,k i, j i
Pi (k j)/P(k j)
(n − 1)(n − 2)/2 ,
where Pi(kj) is the number of shortest paths between k and j that include i and P(kj) is
the total number of shortest paths between k and j. Again, Pajek provides a measure
for the overall betweenness centrality of a network (“Betweenness Centralization”),





CeB∗ (g) − CeBi (g)
)
n − 1 ,
where CeB∗ (g) is the maximum of the individual betweenness centralities.
While betweenness centrality may say something about who controls the flow
of information in a network, closeness centrality is another measure that may say
something about how fast or how far information from a node spreads. Formally,
closeness centrality measures how close a node is to all the other nodes of the network.




j∈N , j i dist(i, j)
.
If i is an isolated node in the network, i.e. di(g) 0, the convention is that CeCi (g)
is 0. If the network is connected, Pajek provides a measure for the overall closeness
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CeC∗ (g) − CeCi (g)
)
(n − 1)(n − 2)/(2n − 3) .
where CeC∗ (g) is the maximum of the individual closeness centralities. For more on
centrality measures and their use see Freeman (1979) and Borgatti (2005) or any of
the textbooks referenced in the beginning of this section.
A final class of measures that we will consider is clustering or transitivity measures.
Intuitively such measures say something about how likely it are that any two of my
friends are friends themselves. It turns out that in many real social networks clustering
is much higher than in most random networks (Watts and Strogatz 1998). Formally,
for a given node we can ask how many of its neighbors are connected themselves,
which give rise to the following individual clustering measure:
Cli (g)  #{ jk ∈ g|k  jand j, k ∈ Ni (g)}#{ jk|k  jand j, k ∈ Ni (g)} 
#{ jk ∈ g|k  jand j, k ∈ Ni (g)}
di (g)(di (g) − 1)/2 .








This measure of average clustering is referred to in Pajek as “Watts-Strogatz Clus-
tering Coefficient” as it was first proposed by Watts and Strogatz (1998). Note that,
commonly, Cli(g) is taken to be 0 if the neighborhood of i only contains one or zero
nodes (see Jackson (2010) or Newman (2010)). Conversely, Pajek takes Cli(g) to be
plus infinity in this case and does not include the node when calculating the average.










An alternative way of measuring clustering is by reporting the actual number of
“triangles” relative to all possible triangles:
Cl(g) 
∑n
i1 #{ jk ∈ g|k  j and j, k ∈ Ni (g)}∑n
i1 #{ jk|k  j and j, k ∈ Ni (g)}
.
This measure is usually referred to as overall clustering, while in Pajek, the measure
is referred to as “Clustering Coefficient (Transitivity)”. Note that, overall clustering
and average clustering can be different for a particular network.
4 According to Newman (2010), the measure for individual clustering was first introduced by Watts (1999),
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